Abstract -A key challenge confronting system delivery during and after a finite disturbance (Type architects is the specification, development, 11 survivability). The primary goal of this paper is procurement, operation, and maintenance of to enumerate design principles for the achievesystems with critical survivability requirement of both Type and Type 11 survivability. ments. To address this challenge, a generic framework for analyzing system interactions The body of the paper consists of four sections. with natural and synthetic hostile environFirst, motivation is provided for research on ments is introduced and twelve design princisurvivable architecture as a pathway to valueples are proposed for the achievement of robust engineering systems. This includes a survivable system architecture.
INTRODUCTION
ture-the Cold War-era U.S. nuclear command and control system. Second, a preliminary Survivability is traditionally defined in military framework is introduced for modeling survivability systems as the capability to avoid or withstand a as the interaction between a system and a given hostile environment. For example, Ball (2003) hostile environment. The framework includes a analyzes design techniques, armaments, and formal definition of survivability and a simple tactics for combat aircraft survivability [1] . In network representation of system architecture and Ball's framework, survivability is enhanced by both its associated context. reductions in the susceptibility of systems to disturbances (e.g., stealth, maneuverability) and After providing a descriptive framework, the third reductions in the vulnerability of systems to dissection proposes twelve design principles for turbances (e.g., redundant flight controls and enhancing survivability. In particular, six design surfaces, independent fuel feed tanks).
principles for enhancing Type survivability are identified: (1 .1) prevention, (1 .2) mobility, (1 .3)
In this paper, survivability is defined as the ability concealment, (1.4) deterrence, (1.5) preemption of a system to minimize the impact of a finite and (1.6) avoidance. Six design principles for disturbance on value delivery [2] . Similar to Ball's enhancing Type 11 survivability are also enumerformulation, a two-part definition of survivability is ated: (2.1) hardness, (2.2) evolution, (2. 3) redundeveloped in terms of reducing susceptibility and dancy, (2.4) diversity, (2.5) replacement, and (2.6) reducing vulnerability. In particular, it is found that repair. In the fourth section, the temporal propersurvivability may be achieved through either (I) ties of these twelve design principles are mapped the reduction of the likelihood or magnitude of a to a disturbance lifecycle. The paper concludes disturbance (Type survivability) or (2) the satiswith a discussion of the implications of the framefaction of a minimally acceptable level of value work and challenges associated with architecting survivable systems.
MOTIVATION
lected properties of certain subsystems or modules in isolation). Furthermore, existing survivabilThe operational environment of engineering ity engineering methodologies are based on systems is increasingly characterized by disturdomain-specific operating scenarios and presupbances which may asymmetrically degrade perposed disturbance environments and provide formance, particularly for systems with networked limited insights for senior decision-makers trading structures. Examples of impulse events triggering system survivability for cost and utility at the catastrophic losses include the tragic events of highest levels in the system architecture. DevelSeptember 11 th, 2001 [3], the Northeast Blackout opment of a generic survivability framework and of 2003 [4] , and Hurricane Katrina [5] . tools. While a survey of the existing design microsatellite attacks, nuclear detonation), (2) that paradigms for survivability is outside of the scope the impact of such surprise attacks could constiof this paper, a descriptive look at existing survivtute a "Pearl Harbor" in space, and (3) that there able architectures is necessary for establishing a is a need to increase spending on space surveilbaseline for enumerating design principles. In this lance and control measures [7] .
spirit, a retrospective overview of a "flagship" example of survivable system architecture is Despite growth in the scope, frequency, and provided-the U.S. Nuclear Command and Conmagnitude of disturbances, a 2000 report for the trol System (NCCS) during the Cold War. U.S. Army Research Laboratory on systems and networks with critical survivability requirements When thinking of survivable systems, one of the draws several troubling conclusions [8] . In parfirst examples that comes to mind is the collection ticular, inadequacies are identified in the ability of of offensive, defensive, and intelligence systems systems engineers and architects to manage such operated by U.S. Strategic Command to fulfill the risks. Existing criteria and systems architecting mission of strategic deterrence. Military systems methodologies for evaluating highly survivable for nuclear war may be broadly decomposed into systems and networks are found to be "incomreconnaissance systems for target selection plete and inadequate." Furthermore, it is noted ground-and space-based sensors for early warnthat there is "almost no experience in evaluating ing; fixed and mobile command and control censystems having a collection of independent criteters; and the triad of offensive submarines, bombria that might contribute to survivability" nor in ers, and land-based intercontinental ballistic examining the interactions among different critemissiles. Given that the systems were designed ria. These shortcomings make it difficult to specto operate in a wide range of extremely hostile ify, develop, procure, operate, and maintain environments-from the extreme blast, heat, and systems with critical survivability requirements.
fallout of a nuclear exchange to the impact of a chemical, biological, or electromagnetic pulse In addition to being a poorly understood system (EMP) weapon-a host of survivability lessons property, survivability at the architecture level is may be learned from studying the design of their further complicated when issues extending betechnical, operational, and organizational architecyond design of the technical system are internalture.
ized, such as operational behavior, human factors, and supporting infrastructures [9] . Although
Rather than analyzing all military systems associsurvivability is an emergent property of system ated with strategic deterrence, the focus here is architecture that has meaning primarily in the on the NCCS. When the U.S. switched from a overall context to which it relates, conventional policy of massive retaliation to one of flexible approaches to survivability engineering are often response in 1961, survivable communications reductionist in nature (i.e., focused only on se-(i.e., maintaining operational capability after a While the four design principles of NCCS survivSoviet first-strike) between central authorities and ability discussed above provide a fairly complete the nuclear forces became a military requirement.1 enumeration of the physical attributes providing As a system designed against this nuclear decapisurvivability, the discussion neglects critical tation attack scenario, the NCCS is a strong architectural elements of operational behavior and candidate for a case study on survivability.
organizational design. For example, with decision cycles in a nuclear war measured in minutes [12] , The NCCS may be functionally decomposed into development of a scripted operational plan for five areas: situation monitoring, tactical warning, every conceivable contingency may be as essendecision-making, force management, and force tial to providing a credible deterrent against a direction [10] . Situation monitoring includes both decapitation threat as the survivability of the the collection of strategic intelligence to anticipate nuclear force itself. crises and weather monitoring to support airborne operations. Tactical warning consists of the set of
The sensitivity of NCCS survivability to operaactivities to determine the origin, size, and target tional behavior and organizational design is best of an attack. In supporting decision-makers in illustrated in the transition in the 1960's away from crafting a response, tactical warning requires a the massive retaliation policy to a flexible rehigh degree of certainty (e.g., dual phenomenolsponse paradigm that required NCCS survivability ogy provided by satellites and radars). Force [11] . Facing the challenge of inheriting a legacy management and direction includes the standard NCCS infrastructure that was not designed for operating procedures involved in assuring negasurvivability but without resources to build a new tive and positive control (i.e., prevention of acciinfrastructure, designers succeeded in redental launches and implementation of presidenarchitecting the existing NCCS infrastructure for tial release orders, respectively).
survivability by restructuring tactics, procedures, and operating rules. In particular, the decapitation The current survivability of the NCCS is attributed risk was mitigated by making the presidential to four design principles: (1) hardening, (2) mobilcommand center a "safety catch" that, when ity, (3) redundancy, and (4) concealment [10] .
operational, prevented other command centers These four design principles manifest themselves from firing. If the safety catch was removed, differently in the various nodes and links of the second-strike emergency authorization is implicitly NCCS (e.g., contrast hardening of the NORAD granted to decentralized authorities (i.e., one-and Cheyenne Mountain Complex to the Milstar two-star generals), removing the prospect of a satellite constellation). Additionally, each design single-point failure in the command structure. principle does not contribute equally to architecture survivability. For example, in the early Four main lessons may be extracted from tracing 1980's, there were concerns that Soviet strategic the evolution of NCCS through the Cold War with forces could overwhelm virtually all U.S. groundimplications for survivable system architecture. based command and control and that the U.S.
First, the success in re-architecting the system for was dependent on airborne command posts and survivability in the 1960's illustrates the impor-TACAMO relay aircraft for post-attack control over tance of considering methods that extend beyond the submarine force [11, 12] . These concerns the domain of physical design to include organizasuggest that mobility was more important for tions and operational behavior. Given the sucachieving NCCS survivability than the hardening cess in transitioning the NCCS in the 1960's from and redundancy provided by the network of fixed a non-survivable to a survivable architecture command locations in the Pentagon, Offutt Air without major physical modifications, might it be Force Base, Fort Ritchie, and Cheyenne Mountain possible similarly to transition critical U.S. infra- [10] .
structures to less vulnerable states today by restructuring procedures and operating rules? Second, the emphasis on executing scripted 1 If early warning sensors detected a nuclear contingency plans underscores the criticality of attack by the Soviet Union during the period of timely decision-making under uncertainty within 1955-60, U.S. policy was to launch a full retaliahostile environments. Third, the strategic interaction between the time of launch and strike. As tions characterizing the NCCS context (e.g., such, the NCCS was superfluous after the PresiMutually Assured Destruction) suggests that it is dential release order and was therefore not originot adequate to consider individual disturbance nally designed for survivability [11] .
events when dealing with an intelligent adversary.
Rather, it is necessary to take a longer view by
As noted in Ball's formulation for aircraft combat considering design principles for lifecycle survivsurvivability [1] , design for survivability may be ability which may influence the strategic behavior approached in terms of reducing susceptibility and of adversaries. Fourth, while the NCCS is an in terms of reducing vulnerability. Survivability excellent case for enumerating design principles may be achieved through either (1) the reduction for survivability, it is important to note its limitaof the likelihood or magnitude of a disturbance tions: (1) the design principles explicitly linked to (Type survivability) or (2) the satisfaction of a NCCS survivability [10] are limited to the physical minimally acceptable level of value delivery during domain, and (2) the design principles as maniand after a finite disturbance (Type 11 survivabilfested in the NCCS are not economically deployity). able to current survivability challenges such as those associated with hardening critical public Figure 1 illustrates survivability across two epochs infrastructures. Accordingly, two of the goals of [13] , time periods of a fixed environment. Followthis research are to provide a complete enumeraing successful value delivery during Epoch la, the tion of design principles for survivability and to system experiences a finite disturbance during develop a methodology for parsing out the reEpoch 2 that degrades performance. Once the quired principles for a given design. disturbance ceases, the environment reverts back to the original context, Epoch lb. In order to THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK determine whether the system is survivable, several factors must be defined: the minimum
After providing a value-centric definition of survivacceptable value to be delivered during the disability, this section introduces a preliminary frameturbance [Ve], the permitted recovery time elapsed work for modeling survivability as the outcome of past the onset of the disturbance [Tr], the minithe interaction between a system and a given mum acceptable recovered value after the recovhostile environment.
ery period is complete [Vj] . In Figure 1 , the system achieves Type 11 survivability by maintainSuccess of a system is dependent on how much ing value delivery [V(t)] at a level above the emervalue it is perceived to deliver to its stakeholders. gency value threshold [Ve] and then recovering to Value, in this sense, is considered to be synonydeliver value above the expected value threshold mous with net benefit (received benefits less costs
[Vx] within the permitted recovery time [Tr] . Type for receiving those benefits). Unless the stakesurvivability would have been achieved if the holders care about the mechanism by which value disturbance never reduces the delivered value is delivered, which is rare, the system is free to [V(t)] below the expected value threshold [Vx] and deliver value by many possible means. Taking would appear to be a relatively straight line in a the value-centric perspective, system designers similar figure. are freed to consider multiple paths to achieve the same value delivery [13] . This is particularly Having framework a develon orvivalizina preliminary framework is developed for visualizing Survivability is the ability of a system to the design principles of survivability (Figure 2 ).
minimize the impact of a finite disturbance
Consisting of the minimum set of elements on value delivery, needed to describe the interaction between a system and a given hostile environment, the framework includes (1) a simple network repretion, (1.2) mobility, (1.3) concealment, (1.4) detersentation of heterogeneous nodes and arcs of the rence, (1.5) preemption, and (1.6) avoidance. technical system architecture, (2) a system operator characterized by an internal change agent, and Prevention (1.1) (3) a hostile environment characterized by an external change agent. Changes in the arrangePrevention is the suppression of a future orpotenment of these three elements will be used to tial future disturbance. Through the prevention provide insights into survivability.
design principle, disturbances are not given the opportunity to become a threat to the system. in turn governs disturbance activity. This model of the behavior of the external agent is inspired by Mobility is the ability to relocate to avoid detection. the Boyd cycle, also known as the Observe, Through the mobility design principle, the disturOrient, Decide, and Act (OODA) loop [14] . Develbance agent's ability to effectively observe the oped to prescribe activity in combat, the OODA system is diminished because the system is loop emphasizes getting "inside" the decision changing locations, thereby making a decision to cycle of an enemy to enhance military success attack the system more difficult. Examples of the and survivability. The ODA loop representation of principle include the Navy TACAMO E-6 strategic the decision-making of an intelligent adversary is communications aircraft which is constantly used in this paper to parse out the design princichanging locations to avoid detection, and the ples of survivability that are related to the strategic Scud launcher vehicles, which were often relointeraction between the internal and external cated during the first Gulf War conflict to confound change agents.
U.S. forces attempting to destroy them. .consider a larger tradespace of survivable de- Figure 15 . Mapping of Design Principles to signs. The success of this portfolio of survivable Disturbance Lifecycle design principles will vary with context. Designs that achieve a successful balance of survivability, Each design principle in Figure 15 is classified as performance, and cost will almost certainty incoreither passive or active. A focus on passive porate a subset of the twelve principles with principles will lead to the construction of closed varying weights. (static) systems that resist disturbance based on projections of the operational environment. A CONCLUSION focus on active principles will lead to the construction of open (dynamic) systems that cope with Given challenges in the specification, developfuture uncertainty by stressing architectural agility ment, procurement, operation, and maintenance to recover from disturbances ( Table 1) . The of systems with critical survivability requirements, distinction between passive and active survivabiltwelve design principles for survivability have ity is useful because it specifies which design been enumerated. Survivability was defined in terms of value and described as emerging from the interaction between a system and its context.
PROPOSED DESIGN PRINCIPLES internalcontext
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